Checkbook Journalism: It May Involve Free Speech Interests but It Is Not Free; Can Witnesses Be Prohibited from Selling Their Stories to the Media Under the First Amendment? by Vassiles, Chrysanthe E.
Checkbook Journalism: It May Involve Free
Speech Interests but It Is Not Free; Can Witnesses
Be Prohibited from Selling Their Stories to the
Media Under the First Amendment?
CHRYSANTHE E. VASSILS*
I. INTRODUCTION
A woman witnesses a white Ford Bronco resembling the vehicle of a
defendant in a high-profile double-murder case driving recklessly near the
scene of the crime on the night of the murders. The woman is paid $5000 to
tell her story on Hard Copy, a television tabloid show, and $2600 to recount
her story for the Star, a supermarket tabloid newspaper. Afterwards, the
prosecution declines to call the woman to testify at the grand jury proceeding
because she now lacks credibility due to the profitable deal she made with the
media.'
In response to situations such as these, the California State Legislature
enacted legislation that prohibits a witness to a criminal event or occurrence
from accepting or receiving any compensation in exchange for providing
information obtained as a result of witnessing that event or occurrence.2
* The author wishes to thank the members of her family and her close friends for their
continued support and encouragement.
I This incident occurred in the much publicized 0.1. Simpson double-murder case,
People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Oct. 3, 1995). See Robin Clark, Tabloids Are
Paying, but at a Cost: Journalism by Oeckbook Is a Big Problem in High-Profile Cases,
PHRADELPHIA INQUIWR, July 3, 1994, at C1, C8; Henry Weinstein, Free-Spending Tabloid
Media CauingJudidal Concemr, L.A. TIMEs, July 2,1994, at Al, A2.
2 CAL. P n L CODE § 132.5 (Deering 1995). The statute reads in pertinent part:
§132.5. Disclosure of information relating to crime by prospective witnesses for
valuable consideration
(a) The Legislature supports and affirms the constitutional right of every person to
communicate on any subject. This section is intended to preserve the right of every
accused person to a fair trial, the right of the people to due process of law, and the
integrity ofjudicial proceedings. This section is not intended to prevent any person from
disseminating any information or opinion. The Legislature hereby finds and declares
that the disclosure for valuable consideration of information relating to crimes by
prospective witnesses can cause the loss of credible evidence in criminal trials and
threatens to erode the reliability of verdicts. The Legislature further finds and declares
that the disclosure for valuable consideration of information relating to crimes by
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Witnesses who violate California Penal Code section 132.5 face penalties of up
to six months in jail and a fine of up to three times the compensation they
received for their information.3 The statute does not prohibit witnesses from
divulging information if they do not receive any payment.4
The O.J. Simpson double-murder case5 prompted intense media coverage,
prospective witnesses creates an appearance of injustice that is destructive of public
confidence.
(b) A person who is a witness to an event or occurrence that he or she knows is a crime
or who has personal knowledge offacts that he or she knows or reasonably should
know may require that person to be called as a witness in a crbninal prosecution shall
not accept or receive, directly or indirec, any money or its equivalent in
consideration for providing information obtained as result of witnesing the event or
occurrence or having personal knowledge of the facts.
(c) Any person who is a witness to an event or occurrence that he or she reasonably
should know is a crime shall not accept or receive, direc or indirectly, any money or
its equivalent in consideration for providing information obtained as a result of his or
her witnessing the event or occurrence.
Id. (emphasis added).
3 The statute reads in pertinent part:
(d) The Attorney General or the district attorney of the county in which an alleged
violation of subdivision (c) occurs may institute a civil proceeding. Where a final
judgment is rendered in the civil proceeding, the defendant shall be punished for the
violation of subdision (c) by a fine equal to 150 percent of the amount received or
contractedfor by the person.
(e) A violation of subdivision (b) is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for a
term not exceeding sir months in a county jail, a fine not exceeding three times the
amount of compensation requested, accepted, or received, or both the bprisonment
andfme.
(f) This section does not apply if more than one year has elapsed from the date of any
criminal act related to the information that is provided under subdivision (b) or (c)
unless prosecution has commenced for that criminal act. If prosecution has commenced,
this section shall remain applicable until the final judgment in the action.
Id. (emphasis added).
4 CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a) ("This section is not intended to prevent any person
from disseminating any information or opinion."). Furthermore, this statute does not
prohibit witnesses from selling their stories after the trial. Id. For text from this statute, see
supra note 2.
50.1. Simpson, a former NFL star turned actor and company spokesperson, was
charged with killing his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ronald Goldman on
June 12, 1994 in front of Nicole's Brentwood condominium. People v. Simpson, No.
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ultimately affecting the investigation of the crime.6 Subsequently, Assembly
Speaker Willie Brown introduced this legislation in an effort to stop the
media's attempts to use financial incentives, known as checkbook journalism,7
to gain information in high-publicity cases like the Simpson case.8 Speaker
Brown has said that he believes when witnesses are offered money in exchange
for divulging their testimony to the media, some witnesses are motivated to lie
or embellish their stories. 9 Proponents of the law fear that these media
payments create doubts in jurors' minds about a witness's credibility, 10 and
thus, guilty individuals might be acquitted, or conversely, innocent individuals
could be convicted if important witnesses are compromised by selling their
stories to the press.11
This legislation is the first of its nature to be enacted in the United States.1 2
Consequently, no case law exists which interprets the legislation or examines
its constitutionality. Many legal scholars have criticized the legislation as a
restraint on the freedom of speech13 guaranteed in the First Amendment to the
BA097211 (Cal. Oct. 3, 1995).
6 Gov. Gets Checkbook Journalism Bills, UPI, Aug. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS
Nexis Library UPI File. Several witnesses sold their stories to the tabloid media and thus
cast doubts on their credibility. See introductory paragraph infra part I for example. Brian
"Kato" Kaelin, Simpson's houseguest, is another witness that has profited by divulging
information about the case. See KATO KAELiN, KATO KAELIN: THE WHOLE TRUrH (1995)
(chronicling his relationships with OJ. Simpson and Nicole Brown Simpson).
7 See generally Louise Mengelkoch, When Checkbook Journalism Does God's Work,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 35. "'Checkbook journalism' has become
the buzzword for the unsavory practice of paying Michael Jackson's personal servants, or
Bill Clinton's bodyguards, or the store clerk who sold OJ. Simpson a knife to tell all,
whether it's true or not." Id.
8 Gov. Gets Checkbook Journalism Bills, supra note 6.
9 Calijbrnia Moves to Silence Wtnesses Before Trial, REUrERs, Aug. 30, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
10 rwin Chemerinsky, Should Witnesses Be Allowed to Sell Their Stories Before the
Trial?; Yes: There is Instffcient Cause to Override the First Amendment and Ban the Selling
of Storiesfor Profit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, atB7.
11 Id.
12 However, Representative Marilyn I. Reid, an Ohio legislator, introduced 1995 OH
H.B. 41, legislation mirroring that of California to be adopted in Ohio. See Catherine
Candisky, Law Would Bar Selling Tesimony: Legislator Wants to Prevent Tainting of
Ciminal Trials, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 1995, at D3. Similar legislation has been
proposed in several other states as well. See 1995 IL S.B. 344; 1995 MA S.B. 878; 1994
NJ A.B. 2208.
13 Simpson-Inspired Bill Moves Ahead, UPI, Aug. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
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United States Constitution.14 First Amendment advocates have expressed
concern that the legislation is too broad and therefore may be
unconstitutional.15 One legal scholar has even opined that the First Amendment
demands that restrictions on speech be justified by more than a hypothesized
harm and a distaste for the media's checkbook journalism practices. 16
Speaker Brown maintains that California Penal Code section 132.5 does
not violate free speech interests because the legislation is narrowly tailored to
protect the right of a defendant to a fair trial and the right of witness to free
speech. 17 Moreover, the California State Legislature has justified the legislation
on Sixth Amendment grounds by claiming that the statute is necessary to
ensure a fair trial for criminal defendants.18
This Note will address the issue of whether California Penal Code section
132.5 violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Part 11 of
this Note will analyze the statute under the doctrine of prior restraint to
determine if the statute is necessary to promote the government's interest in
ensuring a fair trial by averting the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Part
I will be a study of content-based regulations. This study will include an
analysis of the California statute under the strict scrutiny standard of content-
based regulations, scrutinizing in particular the government's interest in
maintaining a fair trial by preventing dishonest testimony and increasing the
jurors' confidence in the testimony of key witnesses. Part IV discusses whether
the speculative benefits that the legislation provides are sufficient to justify its
burden on freedom of speech. Finally, Part V will reiterate the reasons why the
statute is unconstitutional under the freedom of speech clause of the First
Amendment and will suggest alternatives that courts can utilize which are less
intrusive upon freedom of speech than California's legislation.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ... .").
15 Gov. Gets Checkbook Journalism Bills, supra note 6.
16 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at B7.
17 Brown Discusses Proposal to Outlaw Checkbook Journalism (CNN television
broadcast, July 29, 1994).
18 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a) ("The Legislature... finds and declares that the
disclosure for valuable consideration of information relating to crimes by prospective
witnesses can cause the loss of credible evidence in criminal trials and threatens to erode the
reliability of verdicts.... [and] creates an appearance of injustice that is destructive of
public confidence."). For text from this statute, see supra note 2.
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I1. TBE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTrMNE
A. First Amendnent Introduction
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... "19 Incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the First Amendment restrictions apply with equal
force to the states.20
B. Prior Restraint
The United States Supreme Court has consistently extended First
Amendment protection to speakers21 and their channels for speech.22 However,
First Amendment protection of listeners' rights has been ambiguous23 Thus,
First Amendment doctrines remain primarily communicator-oriented. 24 In
19 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
20 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ("It is no longer open to
doubt that the liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.").
21 The Court's protective stance toward speakers is most evident in its protection of
unpopular or offensive speakers. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (acket
bearing "Fuck the Draft" message is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech of Ku Klux Klan member can be
restricted only when the danger of inciting a crowd to violence is substantial and imminent);
see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning of flag is expressive activity that is
protected by the First Amendment); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Nazi group is allowed to march through Skokie, Illinois, a
predominantly Jewish community).
22 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988)
(striking down ordinance that gave mayor power to grant or deny applications to publishers
for annual permits to place newsracks on public property) (four justices constitute a majority
in this case because Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy did not take any part in
the consideration or decision); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (holding that school board meeting held open to
the public could not exclude teachers); Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down city ordinances that forbade distribution of
leaflets).
2 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). This case is recognized as the
first articulation by the Supreme Court of the right to receive information. The Court based
the right to receive information on a model of the First Amendment in which public debate
was deemed essential if enlightenment was ever to triumph over ignorance. Id. at 143.
24 Rene L. Todd, Note, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response
199s] 1623
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particular, the prior restraint doctrine assumes that restricting speakers prior to
the dissemination of their speech is the primary evil at which the First
Amendment is aimed.25 The communicator-oriented approach becomes a
problem when potential listeners claim a First Amendment right to hear the
words of willing speakers.
This problem has been evidenced by recent efforts of media organizations
to challenge judicial orders that restrict the freedom of speech of trial
participants, including witnesses. 26 In such cases, members of the media assert
a right to receive the speech of trial participants rather than a right to speak
themselves. Most courts have responded to these challenges under traditional
communicator-oriented prior restraint doctrine analysis. 27
The current standard28 for reviewing prior restraints was set forth in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuat. 29 According to the United States
Supreme Court, a prior restraint on the press may be utilized to protect the
integrity of criminal proceedings only if "the 'gravity of the evil'" justifies
such an invasion of free speech "'as is necessary to avert the danger.'" 30 In
applying this test, a trial court must consider: "(a) the nature and extent of
to Media Gwallenges of Gag Order Directed at Trdal Participants, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 1171,
1171 (1990).
25 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (in striking down an
injunction against the publication of a newspaper that criticized local officials, the Court
stated that the primary goal of the First Amendment was to prevent prepublication
restraints).
26 See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (challenger was both a member of
the press and a trial participant); Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th
Cir. 1986) (challenger was a media source attempting to obtain interviews with jurors);
CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (network broadcasting station challenged
restrictive order enjoining discussions of case); Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F.
Supp. 38 (D. Conn. 1987) (media source sought preliminary injunction enjoining
enforcement of order prohibiting attorneys in state criminal matter from making statements
to the media).
2 7 See cases cited supra note 26.
28 The prior restraint doctrine can be traced back to the case of Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that
allowed the state to enjoin the publication of malicious, scandalous, and defamatory
newspapers. Id. at 701-02. The Court held that the chief purpose of the freedom of press
guarantee was to prevent previous restraints on publication. Id. at 713.
29 427 U.S. 539 (1976). This opinion is famous for its statement that "[i]f it can be said
that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint
'freezes' it at least for a time." Id. at 559 (citing ALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, THE MORALITY
op CONSENT 61 (1975)).
30 Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950),
afrd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
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pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate
the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how effectively a
restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger." 31 The Court
noted that prior restraints on publication bear a heavy presumption against
validity.3 2 The heavy constitutional presumption against prior restraints
recognizes that prior restraints are inherently more harmful to free speech
interests than other forms of regulation33 because prior restraints allegedly
endanger protected speech by inducing self-censorship, 34 by increasing the
coverage of regulation, 35 and by delaying the dissemination of speech.36 Thus,
in application, the prior restraint test functions as a virtual ban on censorship of
the press.37
Once a court decides that an action constitutes a prior restraint, the
presumption in favor of free speech controls the outcome unless the
circumstances surrounding the prior restraint are compelling.38 Subsequent
punishment for libel or slander, for example, is preferred to prior restraints
because, in contrast to the immediate and irreversible sanctions imposed by
prior restraints, 39 subsequent punishment delays the regulation's impact until
all harm caused by the expression is known and all appellate review has been
exhausted, thus reducing the chance of erroneous speech suppression.40
1. Butterworth v. Smith
In Butterworth v. Smith,41 the United States Supreme Court was asked to
review a Florida statute42 prohibiting grand jury witnesses from disclosing their
31 Id.
32 Id. at 558.
33  e Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53 (1984).
34 Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MiNN.
L. REv. 11, 24-49 (1981).
35 Id. at 49-63.
36 Id. at 30-33.
37 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Smart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
38 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
3 9 See AL xANDERM. BIcKEL, TH MoaALrrYoFCoNsENT 61 (1975).
40 See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 556-62.
41494 U.S. 624 (1990).
4 2 Id. at 627. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(1)A grand juror... or any other person appearing before the grand jury shall not
disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury ... except when
required by a court to disclose the testimony for the purpose of:
19951 1625
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testimony after the end of the grand jury's term.43 In its review of the case, the
Court recognized that grand jury secrecy was important to safeguard a number
of interests.44 Included among these interests was a fear that witnesses who
appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly
if the proceedings were not kept secret, as these witnesses would not only be
subject to retribution but to inducements as well.45 The Court recognized that
the invocation of grand jury interests is not "some talisman that dissolves all
constitutional protections."46 Instead, the Court recognized that grand juries are
expected to "operate within the limits of the First Amendment." 47 Thus, the
Court balanced the reporter's First Amendment rights against Florida's
interests in preserving the confidentiality of its grand jury proceedings,
concluding that the interests advanced by the Florida statute were not sufficient
to overcome the reporter's First Amendment right to free speech.48
In the Butterworth case, the Court examined its earlier ruling in the case of
(a)Ascertaining whether it is consistent with the testimony given by the witness before
the court;
(b)Determining whether the witness is guilty of perjury; or
(c)Furthering justice.
(2)It is unlawful for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose, divulge, or
communicate to any other person, or knowingly to cause or permit to be published,
broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other person, in any manner
whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, or the content,
gist or import, thereof, except when such testimony is or has been disclosed in a court
proceeding ....
FLA. STAT. ch. 905.27 (1989).
43 The respondent in this case was a reporter who, while writing a series of newspaper
articles, obtained information relevant to alleged improprieties committed by the Charlotte
County State Attorney's Office and Sheriff's Department. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 626.
The reporter was called to testify about the allegations in front of a special grand jury
convened as a part of the investigation. Id. At the proceeding, the reporter was informed
that revealing his testimony in any manner could result in criminal prosecution for a
violation of Florida Statute ch. § 905.27. Id. After the grand jury terminated its
investigation, the reporter made plans to publish a news story about the subject matter of the
investigation, including the reporter's own testimony and experiences in dealing with the
grand jury. Id. at 628. Subsequently, the reporter filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that
the Florida statute was an unconstitutional abridgment of speech and seeking an injunction
preventing the state from prosecuting him. Id.
44 Id. at 630.
45 Id.
46 Id. (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973)).
47 Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972)).
48 Id. at 636.
1626 [Vol. 56:1619
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Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,49 wherein the Court reviewed a
Virginia statute that made it a crime to divulge information regarding
proceedings taking place before the state judicial review commission.50 A
newspaper publisher had been convicted of violating the statute after publishing
an article identifying the state judge who was under investigation.51 In
Landmark Communications, Inc., the Court found that the conviction violated
the United States Constitution, concluding that the publication lay near the core
of the First Amendment, and the interests advanced by imposing criminal
sanctions were insufficient to justify the actual and potential prohibitions on
freedom of speech and of the press which would follow. 52 Even though the
Court assumed that the confidentiality of the judicial review proceedings served
legitimate governmental interests, the Court observed that the state had
"offered little more than assertion and conjecture to support its claim that
without criminal sanctions the objectives of the statutory scheme would be
seriously undermined." 53
In contrast, in Butterworth, the reporter was prohibited from divulging
information that was in his possession before he testified in front of the grand
jury, not information that he may have obtained as a result of his presence at or
participation in the proceedings of the grand jury.54 The ban extended not only
to the life of the grand jury but also into the indefinite future.5 5 Thus, the
potential for abuse of the Florida prohibition as a device to silence those who
knew of unlawful conduct or irregularities on the part of public officials was
apparent to the Court.56 Also, the Court recognized, as it had in earlier cases,
that when a person "'lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance,'" "'state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order.'" 57
In Butterworth, Florida sought to punish the publication of information
relating to alleged governmental misconduct; speech that has traditionally been
recognized as lying at the core of the First Amendment. 58 To justify such
49 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
50 Butterwrth, 494 U.S. at 631 (citing Landmark Connunications, Inc., 435 U.S. at
829).
51Id
52 1d. (citing Landmr Commn'cations, Inc., 435 U.S. at 838).
53 Id. (citing Landmrk Conmuidcadons, Inc., 435 U.S. at 841).
5 4 Id. at 632.
55 d. at 635.
56 I.
57 Id. at 632 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979);
Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)).5 8 See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978); Wood
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
punishment, Florida relied on an interest in preserving grand jury secrecy, but
the Court was not persuaded that interest warranted a permanent ban on the
disclosure by a witness of his or her own testimony, once a grand jury had
been dismissed.59 The Court also observed that "neither the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor the drafters of similar rules in the
majority of the states," imposed an obligation of secrecy "on grand jury
witnesses with respect to their own testimony to protect reputation interests or
any of the other interests asserted by Florida." 60 The Court noted that although
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2), governing grand jury secrecy,
expressly prohibits certain individuals from disclosing "matters occurring
before the grand jury," 61 the pertinent Advisory Committee Notes on Rule
6(e)(2) expressly exempt witnesses from the obligation of secrecy.62 Thus, the
Court found that some of the interests were not served at all by the Florida ban
on disclosure and that those interests that were served were not sufficient to
sustain the statute.6 3
C. Analysis of California Legislation Under Prior Restraint Doctrine
with Regard to Defendant's Fair Trial Interests
Under the test set forth in Nebraska Press Association,64 California Penal
Code section 132.5 is an unconstitutional prior restraint65 on the freedom of
speech of the press. The legislation does not provide for the case-by-case
analysis suggested by the Nebraska Press Association test but instead applies a
broad prophylactic prohibition that tramples unnecessarily upon free speech in
an effort to avert the dangers of prejudicial pretrial publicity. This publicity
could be avoided in other ways. First, not every criminal case in the state of
California will garner the kind of extensive pretrial news coverage that might
jeopardize a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, therefore, applying a broad
prohibition against the selling of any information regarding a criminal
occurrence unduly burdens free speech. Second, other judicial or legislative
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1962).
5 9 Butterwonh, 494 U.S. at 632.
60 Id. at 634-35.
61 Id. at 635.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 635-36.
64 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
65 Even though the legislation is not a prior restraint in the traditional sense of the
doctrine, the legislation is a prior restraint in the fact that it censors speech prior to its
dissemination and/or delays its dissemination to the media and to the public. Therefore, by
analogy, the media would have a valid cause of action against the government under the
prior restraint doctrine. See cases cited supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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measures less inhibitory of free speech could be utilized to mitigate the
damages of prejudicial pretrial publicity more effectively than California's
legislation.6 Third, California's legislation will not effectively prevent the
threatened danger of prejudicial publicity. Although the legislation might
discourage the media from providing financial incentives to witnesses willing to
sell their testimony, it will not discourage the media from continuing to pursue
witnesses willing to share their stories in order to garner publicity and fame.
Unless California's interests in enacting the legislation are found to be
compelling, then the presumption favoring the free speech interests of the
media controls the outcome.
As the Court acknowledged in Buterworth,67 the public has a right to
know about the operations of the judicial branch, an agency of democratic
government, 68 and law enforcement practices. 69 The press, in turn, has an
interest in reporting about the judiciary's performance as reflected in such areas
as trial management and the integrity of judges. 70 Giving the media free reign
in reporting contributes to the public's understanding of the legal system's
mechanics and provides the public with a means of assessing the quality of the
criminal justice system. 71 The media has a valid interest in asserting its
freedom to publish a witness's story prior to the witness giving his or her
testimony because doing so enables the public to gain information and
understand the judicial system. Dissemination of such information about the
judicial system would also encourage the public to scrutinize the witness's
published story and thereby enable the public to assess the witness's credibility.
Witnesses also have interests in protecting their right to speak freely and
66 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
67 See discussion supra part II.B.1.
68 e right to know about the operation of the government, including the court
system, derives from the First Amendment right to receive information. See In re Express-
News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 809 (5th Cir. 1982).
69 The Constitution's structure contemplates that:
the processes of law enforcement be open to the public view, both for the purpose of
protecting the innocent and bringing the guilty to boot and for the purpose of exposing
incompetence, venality, or corruption on the part of those who arrest and prosecute and
those who may sit in the seats ofjudgment.
See AssocIATIoN oF THE BAR OF THE CrrY oF NEw YoRK, -INAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
CooQAnrEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND THE ADmRNSTRATION oF JusncE, FREEDOM OF THE
Paass AND FAiR TRIAL 49 (1967).
70 See generally Potter Stewart, Or ofthe Press, 26 HASIGS LJ. 631 (1975).




publicly about the government, including the judiciary. Many witnesses utilize
their free speech rights to comment publicly on pending trials. Analytically,
their First Amendment speech interests differ little from those of the press.
Motivations to speak openly about government range from the libertarian's
interest in free expression to the reformer's desire to bring about political
change by raising public awareness of injustices. Prohibitions that restrict
witnesses' comments raise many free speech concerns because they are
involuntarily haled into court. One element of these prohibitions, however, is
particularly menacing. Because the government is given wide latitude to call as
witnesses all those who conceivably have any knowledge about a criminal
occurrence, prohibitions against public commentary about such proceedings
potentially stifle a wide range of public opinion.72 Similarly, the California
legislation may hinder a wide range of public commentary because the
legislation is written in so broad a manner as to include anyone who has
witnessed or has personal knowledge of a criminal event or occurrence in the
state of California, whether or not the person is a material witness. 73 Thus, the
legislation unnecessarily tramples upon the free speech interest of each and
every person who may be called as a witness in a criminal prosecution without
regard for the fact that each case may not generate much public interest or
prejudicial publicity.
The witness's and the media's interests must be balanced with the criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by an impartial jury74 and
with the government's interest in ensuring that the defendant's rights are
protected. Bias created by press coverage may undermine the public's
7 2 See 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSuTCE, Standard 8-3.6 & commentary at 8.54-
.55 (2d ed. 1980); cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 635 (1990) (ability to prevent
grand jury witnesses from discussing their testimony after the conclusion of the grand jury
proceedings presents the "potential for abuse... through its employment as a device to
silence those who know of unlawful conduct or irregularities on the part of public officials..
. ."). But cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). ("Neither... the accused
[nor] witnesses... should be permitted to frustrate [the court's] function" of providing a
trial by ajury free from outside influences.).
73 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(b) ("[a] person who is a witness to an event or
occurrence... that he or she knows or reasonably should know may require that person to
be called as a witness in a criminal prosecution"). For text from this statute, see supra note
2.
7 4 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."). This right is generally referred to
as the right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510




confidence in the legitimacy of verdicts75 and may cause the defendant to
question the fairness or impartiality of the jury's decision. Prejudicial
information can reach the jury through statements made to the press by officers
of the court, attorneys, witnesses, jurors, and the police.76 Also, the publicity
surrounding spectacular trials may create an atmosphere in which jurors almost
certainly enter into deliberations with preconceived notions concerning the
defendant's guilt or innocence77 or a witness's credibility.
The Supreme Court has responded to threats against a defendant's right to
a fair trial by urging courts to guard more vigilantly against trial prejudice. 78
Sheppard v. Maxw 179 serves as a starting point for courts considering the
judiciary's role in limiting bias:
Given the pervasiveness of modem communications and the difficulty of
effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must
take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent
evaluation of the circumstances .... But we must remember that reversals are
but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the
prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect the processes from prejudicial outside
interferences.50
However, both practically and legally, prejudicial publicity usually does
not pose a serious threat to a criminal defendant's fair trial guarantee.
Prejudicial publicity only occurs in the most extreme of circumstances. When
circumstances are extreme, several preventive measures may be implemented
that may be more effective and less oppressive than the California statute:
extensive voir dire examination of jurors, change of venue, judicial instructions
75 See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 667 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
990 (1969) (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) ("The courts must
take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial
outside interferences.")).
76 See American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (1968); Richard B. Hirst Comment, Silence
Orders-Preserving Political Expression by Defendants and Their Lawyers, 6 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 595, 604, 607 (1971).
77 See United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1962) (en
banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
78 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360-61 (1966). The Court observed that
the problem of prejudicial pretrial publicity could have been avoided by sequestering the
jury for the length of the trial. Id at 363.
79 Id.
80 d. at 362-63.
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not to read or watch press reports, and sequestration of the jury during the trial
may all help to ensure that the jury stays neutral. 81 When trial publicity does
reach jurors, the defendant's right to an impartial jury is not necessarily
violated because the Constitution does not require a perfect trial.8 2 Recognition
of the practicalities involved in trial management03 and acknowledgment of
jurors' abilities to render impartial verdicts, even after exposure to possibly
prejudicial information, allows for some potentially biased information to reach
jurors without impugning the verdict's integrity. 84 For example, in Irvin v.
Dowd,85 the Supreme Court found that a juror's preconception about the guilt
or innocence of an accused does not necessarily destroy that juror's neutrality if
the juror can put aside his or her impression or opinion and render a verdict
based solely upon the evidence presented in court.86 The test is whether the
nature and strength of the opinion formed raises questions regarding
partiality, 7 and the burden of proving actual bias lies with the challenger."8
This test is a difficult one to satisfy;89 a defendant has an insurmountable task
in proving that he or she has been denied the right to a fair trial.
Checkbook journalism may encourage a witness, in exchange for financial
compensation, to publicize information that he or she would otherwise share
only with authorities and while testifying in the courtroom. This could result in
excessive prejudicial publicity and could create a compelling governmental
interest in protecting a criminal defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury.
81 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976); Sheppard, 384
U.S. at 362-63. See also Robert S. Stephen, Note, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding a
Cridnal Trial: What a Trial Court Can Do to Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a "Media
ircus", 26 SunJ-LK U. L. REV. 1063 (1992).82 See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984)
("'[A litigant] is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one,' for there are no perfect trials.")
(citing Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973) (quoting Brunton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) and Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953))).
83 Id.
84 Exposure to some inadmissible information usually constitutes harmless error;
reversals on the grounds that prejudicial publicity deprived a defendant of his or her Sixth
Amendment rights are rare. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
85 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
86 M. at 723.
87 Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878)).
88 Id.
89 See Scott C. Pugh, Comment, Checkbook Journalism, Free Speech, and Fair Trials,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1739, 1749-50 (1995) (discussing two United States Supreme Court
cases that cast doubt on the continued validity of using presumptive bias as a means of
proving a violation of the right to a fair trial and concluding that the standard for proving
jury prejudice is impossible to satisfy).
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However, in light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, 90 a defendant is faced with an insurmountable task when
attempting to prove that the level of juror prejudice has compromised his or her
Sixth Amendment rights. The fair trial interest embodied in the Sixth
Amendment does not require that a jury be entirely unfamiliar with a case but
rather requires that the jury be able to set aside any preconceived impressions
to render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Other methods,
less intrusive upon free speech, are available to ensure that a jury does not
enter a courtroom with preconceived notions about the criminal defendant.
These methods, including voir dire examination, change of venue, and jury
sequestration, when imposed by trial judges on a case-by-case basis are more
narrowly tailored to prevent the harm of prejudicial publicity than this
legislation. Therefore, California Penal Code section 132.5 is not narrowly
tailored to address prejudicial publicity concerns.
Furthermore, not all witnesses will have knowledge of information that
inculpates defendants. Indeed, witnesses may possess information that
exculpates criminal defendants, and thus, the selling of these witnesses'
accounts to the media cannot be said to create the kind of prejudicial publicity
that would taint the jury and cause fair trial concerns for criminal defendants.
Moreover, utilizing a broad prohibition on speech, such as California's statute,
may preclude speech which would contribute to public debate about the
criminal process and its questionable treatment of criminal defendants.
III. CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS
In scrutinizing a statute that prohibits the First Amendment freedom of
speech, courts classify the restriction as content-based or content-neutral. 91 A
court's conclusion that a statute is content-based 92 or content-neutral 93 is
dispositive of the level of scrutiny that the court will apply in ruling on the
constitutionality of the statute.94 A statute that restricts the exercise of free
90 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
91 Susa H. Williams, Content Disain'nation and the First Amendnent, 139 U. PA. L.
Ray. 615, 616 (1991).
92 A content-based restriction is a statute or regulation that singles out speech with a
particular substantive content or message. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49
(1984).
93 A content-neutral restriction is a statute or regulation that restricts speech in a
nondiscriminatory way, i.e., regardless of its content. See Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523 (1994).
94 Elizabeth Buroker Coffin, Constitutonal Law. Content-Based Regulaidons on
Speech: A Compwison of the Categorization and Balancing Approaches to Judi'cial
Scrud'y-Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501
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speech based on the content of the speech will be considered constitutional only
if the statute passes the strict scrutiny test.95 Under the strict scrutiny test, three
elements must be satisfied by the proponent of the statute at issue. First, when
speech is fully protected under the First Amendment, the government cannot
regulate the speech based on its content, even if the speech is harmful, unless
the regulation is necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest.96
Second, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to accomplish this compelling
governmental interest, meaning that a "tight fit" must exist between the
speech's harm and the means used to prevent that harm. 97 Finally, no less
restrictive alternative means of furthering this interest must exist.98 The strict
('interim ed. 1991), 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 593, 612 (1993). The Court's scrutiny is less
severe when the speech restriction is content-neutral. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781,798 (1989) (upholding a concert noise regulation in Central Park, stating that
"a regulation of the time, place or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to
serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so").
95 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (defining strict scrutiny); see
also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (plurality opinion) (finding the statute that
prohibited the displaying of a sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy when the sign
brought disrepute upon the foreign government failed the strict scrutiny test because even
though the interest may have been compelling, more narrowly drawn measures could have
been used).
96 See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978) (finding that law prohibiting corporations from spending money to influence the
vote on any referendum, considered protected expressive activity, that did not materially
affect the corporation's business failed strict scrutiny because the government's interest in
preventing corporations from dominating the political process was not compelling and the
statute was not narrowly drawn). But see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 503 U.S. 377 (1992) (stating
that speech is unprotected and content discrimination is allowed when the basis for the
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue
is proscribable).
97 See generally Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 71-75 (1990)
(invalidating an executive order that instituted a hiring freeze, whereby state officials were
prohibited from hiring any employee, filling any vacancy, or creating any new position
without the governor's permission because these practices were not narrowly tailored to
serve vital governmental interests); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (striking
down a statute that required every publicly-employed teacher to list annually every
organization to which he or she had belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding
five years because the means chosen were not narrowly tailored).
98 See generally Rutan, 497 U.S. at 71-75 (finding that preservation of the democratic
process could be met by less restrictive means, including discharging, demoting, or
transferring persons whose work was deficient and finding that interests in employing
persons who would loyally implement the party's policies could be served by choosing or
dismissing high level employees based on their political views); Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488
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scrutiny test applied to content-based regulations on fully-protected speech is a
balancing test, with a presumption that the speech is protected. In applying this
balancing test, the courts have recognized the need to consider valid
governmental interests in regulating certain kinds of speech. 99
A. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime
Victims Board
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Cime Victims
Board,100 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of New York's
criminal anti-profit or "Son of Sam"'0 law. 102 Simon & Schuster challenged
New York Executive Law section 632-a, 103 on the grounds that the law was an
unconstitutional burden on the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom from
content-based restrictions on speech.1 4
(1960) ("[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved."); Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (striking a ban on the distribution of leaflets because a
less restrictive alternative was available to prevent littering).
9 9 See GERALD GUMNME, CoMTrNAL LAW 997, 1007 (12th ed. 1991).
100 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
10 1 David Berkowitz, who was determined to be the killer, left notes at the scenes of
his crimes signed "Son of Sam." See Police Get a 2d Note Signed by Son of Sam in .44-
Caliber Killings, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 1977, at 2.
102 The law requires that an accused or convicted criminal's income from works
describing his crime be deposited in an escrow account. These funds would then be made
available to victims of the crime and the criminal's other creditors. This law was passed in
the aftermath of the capture of serial killer "Son of Sam." See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502
U.S. at 108; see also Gregory G. Samo, Annotation, Validity, Constuction, and
Application of "Son of Sam" Laws Regulating or Prohibiting Distribution of Oime-Related
Book, Fihn, or Conparable Revenues to Criminals, 60 A.L.R. 4th 1210, 1211-13 (1991).
103 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1995). This law was enacted
in 1977 in response to a rumor that the serial killer, the "Son of Sam," would become
wealthy by telling the story of his crimes to reporters, publishers, and literary agents. See
Case Holds Potential for Books and Films, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1977, at 44. Section 632-
a provides that any person or entity who contracted with an individual accused or convicted
of a crime in New York to reenact the crime or to convey the person's thoughts, feelings,
opinions, or emotions regarding the crime has to submit a copy of the contract to the New
York State Crime Victims Board. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a. The contracting party was
required to pay to the Board all proceeds. Id.
104 Smn & SchuXer, Inc., 502 U.S. at 115. The challenge to the statute arose out of
a contract between Simon & Schuster, a publishing company, and Henry Hill, a mobster
convicted for narcotics trafficking. See George F. Will, A Man for the Mob, WAsH. POST,
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In scrutinizing the New York statute, the Supreme Court reasoned that a
statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if the statute
imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their
speech. 105 This rule is "but one manifestation of a far broader principle:
'Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the
content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.' 106
The Court concluded that New York's "Son of Sam" law was a content-based
regulation by reasoning that the statute singled out income derived from
expressive activity for a burden that the state placed on no other income, and
the burden was directed only at works with a specified content.107 If a criminal
derived financial gain from the sale of his or her expressive work that did not
contain any reference to his or her crime, then these funds would not fall
within the scope of the statute.108 The Court deemed inconsequential the issue
of whether the "speaker" was the criminal or Simon & Schuster. 19
Furthermore, the Court held that section 632-a imposed a financial disincentive
only on speech of a particular content.110 Thus, the Court stated that placing a
financial burden on specified speech was tantamount to preventing speech.111
The Board argued that because the statute at issue applied to any "entity" and
not specifically to the media, the restriction was not prohibited by the First
Amendment, 112 but the Court responded that entities that contract with
criminals for the expression of their thoughts and emotions become a medium
of communication per se. 113
The conclusion by the Court that the statute established a financial
Mar. 23, 1986, at F7. In 1981, Simon & Schuster began plans to publish a book on
organized crime in New York City. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State
Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), revd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
Simon & Schuster struck a deal with Henry Hll in which he would reveal the details of his
life to an author assigned to write the book. New York State Crime ictims Bd., 724 F.
Supp. at 172. Subsequently, the New York State Crime Victims Board learned of the deal
and demanded that Simon & Schuster provide the Board with copies of all contracts and
information regarding payments Simon & Schuster had made to Hill and requested that
Simon & Schuster suspend all future payments to Hill. Fischeui, 916 F.2d at 780.
105 Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 115.








disincentive to create or publish works of a particular content indicated that
strict scrutiny was the proper standard of constitutional review.114 The
application of this standard required New York to show that its regulation was
necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest which was narrowly
drawn to achieve that interest. 115 The Court found that New York had
compelling governmental interests in ensuring that crime victims were fully
compensated by those who harmed them and in ensuring that criminals did not
profit as a result of their crimes.116 However, the Court found that the Board's
interest in securing profits derived from storytelling was no greater than the
Board's interest in securing other assets owned by the criminal.117
Furthermore, the Court also determined that the Board was unable to
demonstrate how restricting such storytelling furthered New York's interest in
transferring "the fruits of crime" from criminals to their victims. 118 Thus, the
Court concluded that although New York had a compelling interest in
compensating victims from the fruits of a crime, New York could not
adequately explain why such compensation should be limited to the proceeds
from the wrongdoer's speech about the crime.' 19
In analyzing the statute, the Court next inquired whether New York had
used a narrowly tailored means of furthering its interests in compensating
victims of crime and in preventing criminals from profiting from their
crimes. 120 The Court held that the means provided for by section 632-a were
overinclusive and that the statute was thus not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
withstand strict scrutiny. 121 First, the Court found that the statute applied to all
works that expressed a criminal's thoughts, emotions, or recollections, even if
mentioned only tangentially. 122 Thus, the theoretical scope of the statute
rendered it overbroad. 123 Second, section 632-a's broad definition of a person
convicted of a crime allowed the Board to place into escrow proceeds derived
from any author's work if the author admitted that he or she had committed a
crime, regardless of whether the author was ever convicted or even accused of
114 Id. at 118.
115 Id.
116Id. at 118-19. The Court stated that the former interest is a valid one served in
every state by its tort laws and that the latter interest is a basic equitable principle that has
been formally recognized by the law. Id. at 119 (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190
(N.Y. 1889)).
117 Id. at 119.
1 18 Id.
119 Id. at 120-21.
120 Id. at 121.
121 Id. at 122 n.**.




the crime. 124 Lastly, the Court pointed to the impact of section 632-a on
statutes of limitation 25 as further evidence that the law was not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to effectively further New York's interest in compensating
victims through the use of the fruits of crime. 126 The Court found that section
632-a was not narrowly tailored enough to achieve the state's compelling
interests, and thus, it failed the second part of the strict scrutiny test. 127
Therefore, the Court unanimously 128 held that New York Executive Law
section 632-a was an unconstitutional burden on the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom from content-based restrictions on speech. 129
B. Analysis of California Legislation Regarding the Content-Based
Regulation Standard
California's legislation, California Penal Code section 132.5, restricting the
practices of checkbook journalism, is similar in many respects to New York's
"Son of Sam" law. Like the "Son of Sam" law, the California statute
discriminates against speech based on its content. The California statute places
a financial burden, in the form of a disincentive to speak to the media, on
speech of a particular content, that of a criminal event or occurrence. 130
Furthermore, while witnesses are permitted to give information to the media,
they are prohibited from receiving payment for doing so. 131 Thus, California's
legislation is a classic example of the type of content-based regulation that the
United States Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster pronounced to be a content-
bas d regulation, presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment. 132
124 Id. at 121. The Court postured that had the law been in effect at the time and place
of publication, the law would have escrowed payment for The Autobiography of Malcolm X,
which discusses crimes committed by the civil rights leader before he became a known
figure, and Qvil Disobedience, in which author Henry David Thoreau recounts tax evasion
and jail time. Id. See A. HALEY & MALCOLM X, THE AUrOBIOGPHY OF MALCOLM X
(1964); H. DAVID THOREAU, CIVLDSOBEDIENCE (1849, reprinted 1969).
125 Id. at 123. The Court reasoned that if a prominent figure wrote his or her
autobiography at the end of his or her career and included a confession to stealing in the
beginning of the book, the Board would control the author's income from the book for five
years thereafter and would avail the author's creditors of that income, despite the fact that
the statute of limitations for the criminal incident had expired. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 123.
128 Justice Clarence Thomas did not participate in the decision. Id.
129 Id.
130 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(b)-(c). For text from this statute, see supra note 2.
13 1 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a). For text from this statute, see supra note 2.
132 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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Because the legislation is a content-based regulation, the legislation must be
analyzed under the three-pronged strict scrutiny standard. First, California's
primary interest in enacting the legislation is to protect the criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial. 133 Witnesses who sell their stories to the media may be
tempted to lie or embellish their stories in order to take advantage of media
sensationalism to maximize their profits. One problem that arises is that a
witness who is paid for divulging his or her story to the media prior to
testifying may feel compelled to stand by this earlier embellished story when in
court. Thus, false testimony may be proffered in court proceedings. Another
concern is that jurors may view witnesses that sell their stories to the media as
having sold embellished or untruthful information and thus discount the
credibility of their court testimonies. Therefore, the California legislation may
be viewed as a necessary means of achieving the goal of preventing witnesses
from giving dishonest testimony or discouraging jury disbelief of witnesses,
thereby ensuring that the government achieves its compelling interest in
protecting defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. The government has met the
first prong of the strict scrutiny standard.
Under the second prong of the strict scrutiny standard, the government
must prove that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling
interest; a tight fit must exist between the speech's harm and the means used to
prevent that harm from occurring. Moreover, a less restrictive means of
furthering the government's interest must not exist. The threat of dishonest
testimony and jury distrust of witnesses who sell their stories to the media can
be mitigated by measures that are less intrusive upon free speech interests and
that are more narrowly tailored than section 132.5.
One of these measures is cross-examination. One of the primary functions
of a jury is to assess the credibility of witnesses. Other types of witnesses,
besides media-paid witnesses, have financial incentives to lie or embellish their
stories but are not kept from testifying because of these incentives. These
witnesses include expert witnesses and plea bargaining criminal defendants. An
expert witness is generally paid for his or her testimony.13 4 A plea bargaining
defendant offers testimony that aids the prosecution in exchange for clemency.
The same interests that California is trying to protect through the enactment of
its legislation are in question whenever a paid expert witness or a plea
bargaining criminal defendant testifies in a court proceeding. 135 Yet, cross-
examination is provided so that one can elicit the facts which diminish the
133 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a). For text from this statute, see supra note 2.
134 See FED. R. EVID. 706(b) (entitles court-appointed experts to reasonable
compensation).
135 See Chemerinsky, supra note 10.
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personal trustworthiness of the witness. 136 Cross-examination enables an
attorney to uncover a witness's biases, prejudices, or personal interests in the
outcome of a court proceeding. Moreover, "cross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his [or her]
testimony are tested." 137 Furthermore, a witness may be cross-examined
regarding any financial interests implicated in a case. 138 Anticipation of a
grueling cross-examination may encourage an expert witness not to lie or
embellish his or her testimony during direct examination. A plea bargaining
defendant may be asked whether he or she has been granted immunity or
special treatment by the prosecution because of his or her favorable testimony.
Also, other safeguards exist, such as perjury prosecutions 139 and libel suits, 14°
that further discourage dishonest testimony. Thus, jurors have the ability to
determine whether expert witnesses or plea bargaining defendants are credible
or whether financial incentives have rendered their testimonies unreliable.
In the same manner, cross-examination of a media-paid witness can help a
jury to ascertain whether the witness's story remains credible despite the
remuneration or whether the story is fabricated or exaggerated to exploit media
sensationalism. The jury can assess factors such as the story's credibility,
corroborating evidence or testimony, the witness's demeanor, and the
consistency of the witness's story throughout dealings with authorities and with
the media to determine the ultimate reliability of the witness's testimony.
If cross-examination sufficiently deters the inherent dangers in the induced
testimony of expert witnesses and plea bargaining defendants, then it should
also sufficiently deter the same inherent dangers in checkbook journalism.141
When an expert witness receives money and a plea-bargainer receives clemency
in return for his or her testimony, the government does not regulate the source
136 See 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRALS AT COMMON LAw § 1368, at 37
(Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974).137 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
138 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 22 (john W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
139 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C;A. § 1621(2) (1995) (perjury in federal court is punishable by
a fine of not more than $2000 and imprisonment of up to five years).
140 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defining standards
for cause of action for libel).
141 See Pugh, supra note 89, at 1771. Indeed, in People v. Simpson, No. BA097211
(Cal. Oct. 3, 1995), the judge denied a motion to dismiss a witness who was paid $12,500
by a supermarket tabloid newspaper to share information that O.J. Simpson had purchased a
knife at the cutlery store where the witness was employed. After the motion was denied,
Simpson's attorneys attacked the witness's credibiliy on cross-examintion by questioning




of the inducement. 142 Instead, the government regards cross-examination as an
effective means of discrediting unreliable testimony or dispelling the
appearance of impropriety. 143 Similarly, cross-examination could alleviate fair
trial concerns when checkbook journalism is involved. 144 Therefore, California
Penal Code section 132.5 is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive
means of achieving the state's compelling interests in guaranteeing a criminal
defendant a fair trial.
IV. SPECULATIVE HARM
A. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,145 the United
States Supreme Court concluded that § 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act
of 1978146 was unconstitutional under the Freedom of Speech Clause of the
First Amendment because the speculative benefits that the statute's ban on
honoraria would provide were not sufficient to justify the burden placed on
respondents' freedom to engage in expressive activities. 147
In its analysis of the honoraria ban, the Court determined that the ban's
broad sweep placed a heavy burden on the government to prove its
constitutionality. 148 The case did not involve a post hoc analysis of an
employee's speech and its impact on the employee's public responsibilities but
involved a deterrent to a broad category of expression by an enormous number
of potential speakers. 149 Thus, the honoraria ban placed a heavy burden on
speech because the ban deterred a massive amount of unspoken words based
solely on the speculative fear that the speech might threaten governmental
interests. 150 Furthermore, the Court recognized that, unlike adverse action
taken in response to actual speech, the honoraria ban chilled potential speech
142 M. at 1771.
143 I.
144 I.
145 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
146 5 U.S.C. App. § 501 (1994). "An individual may not receive any honorarium
while that individual is a Member [of Congress], officer or employee [of the federal
government]." Id. § 501(b). Congress defined "honorarium" as any compensation paid to a
governmental employee for "an appearance, speech or article." Id. at § 505(3).
147 National Treasry Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1010. Respondents represented
a class composed of Executive Branch employees who, but for § 501(b), would receive
honoraria for works about religion, history, dance, the environment, and the like. Id.
148 Id. at 1013.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1013 n.11.
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before it happened. 151 Therefore, the government had to prove that the interests
of both potential audiences and present and future employees in a broad range
of expression were outweighed by that expression's "necessary impact on the
actual operation" of the government. 152
The Court found that although § 501(b) neither prohibited speech nor
discriminated amongst speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their
messages, its prohibition on compensation imposed a significant burden on
expressive activity. 153 Publishers, for instance, compensate authors, thereby
providing a significant incentive toward more expression. 154 By denying this
incentive, the honoraria ban forced the employees to abandon their expression
if they desired to continue their employment with the government. 155
The Court also recognized that such large-scale disincentive to express
ideas by governmental employees imposed a significant burden on the public's
right to receive the employees' expressive communications. 156 Although it had
no way of measuring the true cost of this burden, the Court felt that the risk
that the public might be deprived of a future famous novelist could not be
ignored. 157
Finally, the Court examined the government's underlying concern in
imposing the honoraria ban. The ban was enacted to prevent federal officers
from misusing or appearing to misuse their powers by accepting compensation
for unofficial and nonpolitical writing and speaking activities.' 58 The Court
found the government's reliance on limited evidence of actual or apparent
impropriety by legislators and high-level executives, together with the
purported administrative costs of avoiding or detecting lower-level employees'
violations of established principles, to be unreasonable. 159
151 Id. at 1014 (citing Near v. Minnesota et rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
152 Id. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S.
563, 571 (1968)).
153 Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991)).
154 /d.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1015 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976)).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1011, 1015.
159 Id. at 1016.
[Wihen the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past
harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply "posit the existence of
the disease sought to be cured.".. . It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real,
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a
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B. Analysis of California Legislation Regarding Speculative Harm
California Penal Code section 132.5, like the legislation at issue in
National reaswy Employees Union, is written so broadly that it places a
heavy burden on the government to prove its constitutionality. The legislation
is not grounded in scientific studies of checkbook journalism's effect on jurors'
perceptions of witnesses. Instead, the legislation is a far-reaching deterrent with
a broad impact on a speculative future harm. The legislation prohibits
checkbook journalism because it may cause the loss of credible evidence in
criminal trials. 160 Thus, the legislation does not take adverse action in response
to actual speech but chills potential speech before it happens. Under the
National Treasury Employees Union test, proponents of section 132.5 must
show that the interests of a vast number of people in freedom of speech are
outweighed by the potential impact on the fair trial guarantee. 161
Although California Penal Code section 132.5 does not prohibit speech per
se, the legislation does impose a significant burden on expressive activity by
prohibiting the receipt of monetary compensation. This disincentive, in turn,
imposes a significant burden on the public's right to receive the witness's
expressive communications. Thus, under section 132.5, the public is denied the
opportunity to assess a witness's credibility, adjudge the judicial process, or
possibly question the system's treatment of criminal defendants. According to
the National Treasury Employees Union test, the greatest concern caused by the
California legislation is its enactment in response to speculative harm. The
Court has stated that when the government defends a regulation on speech as a
means to prevent anticipated harm, it must demonstrate that the harm is real,
and not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will directly alleviate that
harm. 162 Here, California has passed section 132.5 in response to the Simpson
double-murder case; a case that is unprecedented in the media coverage that it
has spawned. Moreover, the harm caused by checkbook journalism in this case
direct and material way.
Id. at 1017 (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2450 (1994). The
Court cited Justice Brandeis for the statement that "[flear of serious injury cannot alone
justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt
women .... To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced." National Treasrwy, 115 S. Ct. at
1017 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (concurring opinion)).
160 The exact wording is "the disclosure for valuable consideration of information
relating to crimes by prospective witnesses can cause the loss of credible evidence." See
CAL. PENAL CoDE § 132.5(a). For text from this statute, see supra note 2.
161 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
162 See Tner Broadcai'ng Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2450.
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is merely conjectural because this legislation was enacted before the verdict was
handed down and before the jury was questioned about its impressions of the
media-paid witnesses. Therefore, the harm caused by checkbook journalism
practices is too speculative to warrant the enactment of legislation that restricts
such a fundamental right as that of freedom of speech.
V. CONCLUSION
California Penal Code section 132.5 is unconstitutional based on three
freedom of speech doctrines. First, the statute is a prior restraint on both the
media and witnesses that hinders public scrutiny of the judicial process.
Although the government has a compelling interest in protecting the rights of a
criminal defendant to a fair trial by restricting prejudicial pretrial publicity,
other less intrusive means of achieving this goal can be utilized. These means,
including jury voir dire, change of venue, special jury instructions, and jury
sequestration, can be used on a case-by-case basis. Second, the legislation is an
unconstitutional content-based regulation because although the government's
interests in preventing dishonest testimony and juror distrust of witnesses who
sell their stories to the media are compelling, these same goals can be achieved
by the less restrictive means of cross-examination. Third, the speculative
benefits that the legislation provides in protecting a criminal defendant's right
to a fair trial are insufficient to justify such a heavy burden on freedom of
speech. Instead, the constitutional guarantee to free speech should be seen as
harmonizing with the constitutional guarantee to a fair trial. "Public scrutiny of
a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a
whole." 163
163 Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
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